Autism and the Pseudoscience of Mind

The theory-of-mind-deficit explanation of autism proposes that autistics lack a theory of mind, that autism comprises a theory-of-mind deficit (strong version); or, that autistics often have difficulty with theory-of-mind abilities (weak version). A growing body of critical research demonstrates how these explanations of autistic behavior fail—both empirically and theoretically. The strong version lacks explanatory adequacy, while the weak version is undermined by methodological and empirical flaws in theory-of-mind research. Together, these issues suggest that the “science” of theory of mind in the context of autism is, at best, bad science. Nonetheless, researchers continue to pursue this line of inquiry in autism studies—often moving the goalposts or offering ad hoc rationalizations to preserve the theoretical framework. This article critically examines the theory-of-mind-deficit explanation of autism, focusing particularly on the widely-held view that autistics exhibit difficulties with theory of mind—i.e., the weak version of the theory-of-mind-deficit explanation. Drawing from the philosophy of science, I argue that ongoing adherence to this view exhibits all the hallmarks of a degenerating research programme. Hence, the fact that scientists have not abandoned this hypothesis entails that the research programme is pseudoscientific.