The Soviet Union’s understanding and reaction to China’s development of strategic deterrence force (1949–1964)

After the founding of New China, facing China’s repeated requests for assistance in the development of the Strategic Deterrence Force (SDF), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) refused on the grounds that China’s economic and technological capabilities were insufficient, that it lacked the conditions for the development of atomic weapons, and that the USSR could provide China with nuclear protection. In the mid-1950s, with the China’s strategic decision making on the development of the SDF and the development of Sino-Soviet relations, the USSR opened the door to China in the field of the peaceful use of atomic energy and expanded its nuclear assistance to China to include the development of SDF in 1957. However, the Soviet Union’s understanding of China’s development of SDF did not change. As the Sino-Soviet conflict developed, the USSR leaders not only began to impose various restrictions on the assistance to the development of SDF, but also repeatedly reneged on the agreement and refused to provide China with the technology for the construction of SDF and to transfer the model of the bomb. In the early 1960s, against the background of further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union, on the one hand, criticized China’s policy on the development of SDF, and on the other hand, tried to obstruct China’s development of SDF. After the successful test explosion of China’s first SDF, the Soviet Union reacted cautiously to China’s nuclear test for political reasons and because of its awareness of China’s nuclear capability.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zhongguo Kexueyuan yuankan
Published
2025-05-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3724/j.issn.1000-3045.20240628001
Primary Topic
European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
Type
article
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article

The Soviet Union’s understanding and reaction to China’s development of strategic deterrence force (1949–1964)

Fang Wang, Haizhi CUI
Zhongguo Kexueyuan yuankan
European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
article

The Soviet Union’s understanding and reaction to China’s development of strategic deterrence force (1949–1964)

Fang Wang, Haizhi CUI
article en

Abstract

After the founding of New China, facing China’s repeated requests for assistance in the development of the Strategic Deterrence Force (SDF), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) refused on the grounds that China’s economic and technological capabilities were insufficient, that it lacked the conditions for the development of atomic weapons, and that the USSR could provide China with nuclear protection. In the mid-1950s, with the China’s strategic decision making on the development of the SDF and the development of Sino-Soviet relations, the USSR opened the door to China in the field of the peaceful use of atomic energy and expanded its nuclear assistance to China to include the development of SDF in 1957. However, the Soviet Union’s understanding of China’s development of SDF did not change. As the Sino-Soviet conflict developed, the USSR leaders not only began to impose various restrictions on the assistance to the development of SDF, but also repeatedly reneged on the agreement and refused to provide China with the technology for the construction of SDF and to transfer the model of the bomb. In the early 1960s, against the background of further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union, on the one hand, criticized China’s policy on the development of SDF, and on the other hand, tried to obstruct China’s development of SDF. After the successful test explosion of China’s first SDF, the Soviet Union reacted cautiously to China’s nuclear test for political reasons and because of its awareness of China’s nuclear capability.

Zhongguo Kexueyuan yuankanVol. 40(Z2)
Openalex Percentile: Top 8%
European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
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