Dynamic Contracting
Dynamic contracting plays a central role in many environments—for instance, in the sale of goods and services to consumers whose preferences evolve through learning, experimentation, or habit formation; in the taxation of workers whose productivity changes with learning-by-doing; in the provision of services on platforms with stochastic entry and exit of buyers and sellers; and in the matching of agents whose values and attractiveness are gradually revealed through past interactions. This article surveys several strands of the recent dynamic mechanism design literature, distills a few lessons, and points to promising directions for future research.
Authors
- Alessandro Massi Pavan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6577-8919)
Institutions
- Northwestern University (US)
- Centre for Economic Policy Research (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Annual Review of Economics
- Published
- 2026-03-04
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080525-114300
- Primary Topic
- Auction Theory and Applications
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00