Proper Names and the Referential-Attributive Distinction

There is reason to think that the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is an instance of a general distinction that also applies to uses of proper names (Saul Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy II 1977). This means that if, as many have argued (against Kripke), the referential-attributive distinction has semantic significance, then the reference of a proper name, as used on a given occasion, may depend on whether or not the name is used referentially on that occasion. The present paper aims to do two things. First, the paper generalizes the referential-attributive distinction in a way that is different from Kripke’s generalization, but still applies to proper names as well as to definite descriptions. This general distinction is between what I call targeted and untargeted uses of noun phrases, including both definite descriptions and proper names. Second, the paper aims to show that targeted uses of proper names are regular and standard, just as targeted (i.e., referential) uses of definite descriptions are. This is important because the most prominent argument for the semantic significance of the referential use of definite descriptions, known as the “Argument from Convention,” is based on the referential use being regular and standard. Having established that the targeted use of proper names is also regular and standard, we are in a position to make a similar argument for the semantic significance of the targeted use of proper names.