Discontent, voice, and loyalty: why states withdraw from Regional International Organizations

Abstract Beyond recent examples such as Brexit or the withdrawal of Nicaragua from the Organization of American States, looking at 73 regional international organizations (RIOs) in existence between 1945 and 2022, over 50 withdrawals occurred. While existing research on state withdrawals alluded to (Hirschman (1970) Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to the decline in firms, organizations, and states. Harvard University Press), we add to this literature by systematically translating Hirschman’s seminal (frame)work into empirical analysis. Thus, we test the corresponding hypotheses on the impact of effective voice and loyalty on actors’ decisions to exit an organization through quantitative analysis combined with insights from narrative evidence. The analysis reveals that shaping opportunities (voice) in the form of veto options and relative state power decrease the chances of exits only in tendency. In contrast, greater loyalty due to low substitutability, attributions of importance, as well as socialization and sunk costs significantly reduce the propensity of states to use the exit option by withdrawing from a RIO. The latter also significantly increases the likelihood that states choose the voice option—in the form of exit threats—rather than withdrawing. The paper thereby contributes to our understanding of the conditions under which RIOs face the greatest risk of disintegration due to exits of member states.