The Design of Centralized Matching Systems on Two-Sided Platforms: Evidence from the Ride-Hailing Market

This paper develops a dynamic structural model to investigate the tradeoff between matching efficiency and agent autonomy in the ride-hailing market.

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Publication Details

Journal
Marketing Science
Published
2026-03-03
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2023.0561
Primary Topic
Transportation and Mobility Innovations
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

The Design of Centralized Matching Systems on Two-Sided Platforms: Evidence from the Ride-Hailing Market

Junhong Chu, Xueli Zhang, Wei Miao, Ivan Png
Marketing Science
Transportation and Mobility Innovations
article

The Design of Centralized Matching Systems on Two-Sided Platforms: Evidence from the Ride-Hailing Market

Junhong Chu, Xueli Zhang, Wei Miao, Ivan Png
article en

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic structural model to investigate the tradeoff between matching efficiency and agent autonomy in the ride-hailing market.

Marketing Science
National University of Singapore (SG), Xiamen University (CN), The London College (GB), University College London (GB), University of Hong Kong (HK)
Openalex Percentile: Top 39%
Transportation and Mobility Innovations
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