An Analysis of U.S. Administrations’ Approaches to the Two-State Solution through National Security Strategy Documents

With the year 2000, the realities on the ground in Palestine underwent significant changes, and structural events that paved the way for new discussions occurred. In this new situation, academic studies have tried to understand and explain the obstacles to a two-state solution while focusing on one-state solution proposals. Although the discussions have generally focused on the impossibility of a two-state solution, the possibility of a solution has also been mentioned. In this context, in addition to the academic community, regional and global actors, as well as heads of state, continue to emphasize a two-state solution. Despite the reality on the ground and the politics in favor of Israel, US policymakers and foreign policy circles have not abandoned the two-state solution rhetoric. Accordingly, some US governments have continued to insist on the “two-state solution” despite the disintegration of the Oslo Process. From this perspective, the study examines the US governments’ approaches to the two-state solution from 2000, when the Oslo Process collapsed and the Second Intifada commenced, to the present. The data were collected from National Security Strategy (NSS) documents published by the US governments between 2000 and 2024 and subjected to thematic content analysis. The main claim of the study is that the US approach to the two-state solution is shaped by periodic and actor-centered preferences rather than a coherent strategic line. The findings suggest that the US discursive stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is shaped by presidents’ normative priorities, ideological orientations, and leadership styles rather than structural foreign policy parameters.