Cultural Evolution and Human Autonomy

This article aims to show that a particular kind of cultural evolutionary approach assumes an image of human nature which is inappropriate from various ontological and theoretical, methodological and empirical, as well as socio-political and ethical aspects. To this purpose, Joseph Henrich’s (2016) seminal work is used as a case study. There, the image of human beings put forward is that of learners who act as they do since they socially learn in a way influenced by innate evolved biases. This image allows for innate, internal causes and processes and for the external ones, and for their interaction. There is little space, however, for causes and processes which could be considered truly autonomous, as stemming from human agency. The article argues that this is a serious problem for the account of individuals, societies and culture proposed by this theory, with significant socio-political implications that are amplified by the societal role of science and scientists. It presents Dupré’s (2001) “loosely Kantian” account as an alternative way of looking at human beings and their place in the world, in which essentially social human ability to act autonomously plays a central role. The article concludes with a call for embracing pluralist perspectives to understanding, and constructing, human beings.