Governance mechanism design for multiple partners involved in a new platform: case studies in China

Purpose This study aims to investigate how new platforms reconfigure their governance structures over time. Drawing on mechanism design theory, the article explores the evolutionary process of platform governance, focusing on how initial centralized or decentralized designs transform into semi-decentralized models. The central argument is that this evolution is driven by the platform’s need to optimize two critical factors: information efficiency and incentive compatibility. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative multiple-case study approach is adopted, examining four Chinese platforms with differing initial governance prototypes. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews, internal documents and secondary materials. Cross-case analysis was conducted to identify governance evolution patterns, control portfolios and underlying mechanisms shaping governance transformation over time. Findings The study reveals that platform governance evolves from centralized or decentralized prototypes into two distinct forms of semi-decentralized governance: leadership-type and alliance-type. This transformation is driven by the dual imperatives of incentive compatibility and information efficiency, achieved through dynamic combinations of gatekeeping, process and relational control. The findings demonstrate that governance evolution is a continuous balancing process between centralization and decentralization in response to multi-actor motivations and information conditions. Originality/value This research advances platform governance theory by conceptualizing governance as a dynamic, evolving mechanism rather than a static choice. By applying mechanism design theory, it introduces a novel explanatory framework linking governance evolution to incentive compatibility and information efficiency. It also extends the understanding of control portfolios as adaptive governance tools facilitating strategic reconfiguration in multi-stakeholder ecosystems.

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Publication Details

Journal
Business Process Management Journal
Published
2026-03-02
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1108/bpmj-10-2025-1615
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Governance mechanism design for multiple partners involved in a new platform: case studies in China

Jie Ting. Tang, Yu Deng
Business Process Management Journal
Digital Platforms and Economics
article

Governance mechanism design for multiple partners involved in a new platform: case studies in China

Jie Ting. Tang, Yu Deng
article en

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to investigate how new platforms reconfigure their governance structures over time. Drawing on mechanism design theory, the article explores the evolutionary process of platform governance, focusing on how initial centralized or decentralized designs transform into semi-decentralized models. The central argument is that this evolution is driven by the platform’s need to optimize two critical factors: information efficiency and incentive compatibility. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative multiple-case study approach is adopted, examining four Chinese platforms with differing initial governance prototypes. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews, internal documents and secondary materials. Cross-case analysis was conducted to identify governance evolution patterns, control portfolios and underlying mechanisms shaping governance transformation over time. Findings The study reveals that platform governance evolves from centralized or decentralized prototypes into two distinct forms of semi-decentralized governance: leadership-type and alliance-type. This transformation is driven by the dual imperatives of incentive compatibility and information efficiency, achieved through dynamic combinations of gatekeeping, process and relational control. The findings demonstrate that governance evolution is a continuous balancing process between centralization and decentralization in response to multi-actor motivations and information conditions. Originality/value This research advances platform governance theory by conceptualizing governance as a dynamic, evolving mechanism rather than a static choice. By applying mechanism design theory, it introduces a novel explanatory framework linking governance evolution to incentive compatibility and information efficiency. It also extends the understanding of control portfolios as adaptive governance tools facilitating strategic reconfiguration in multi-stakeholder ecosystems.

Business Process Management Journal
North Sichuan Medical University (CN), Southwest University of Political Science & Law (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 41%
Digital Platforms and Economics
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Governance mechanism design for multiple partners involved in a new platform: case studies in China — Jie Ting. Tang, Yu Deng · Business Process Management Journal (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS