Common ground and the presuppositions of questions

Abstract The presuppositions of questions have been analyzed in linguistics, logic, and rhetoric, considering their relationship with their triggers, the meaning of a question, and their dialectical effects. From a semantic perspective, presuppositions define the meaning of a question and its type; from a dialectical and rhetorical viewpoint, they serve as instruments for constraining the interlocutor’s possible replies and, when not shared, impose new commitments. From a pragmatic perspective, questions’ presuppositions are commonly regarded as characterized by a univocal relationship with the interlocutors’ common ground: through a question, the speaker takes for granted some contents. However, the pragmatic nature of questions cannot be reduced to a unidirectional act. Rather, the common ground affects the interpretation of a question, and thus its function, meaning, and even its type. This paper intends to show how questions and their (pragmatic) presuppositions are characterized by a complex and dynamic relationship. On the one hand, through questions, the speaker can presume, propose, or impose a common ground. On the other hand, the hearers’ commitments can also affect the determination of what is presupposed, and thus the function, meaning, or even type of question. These complex dynamics can be represented through a presumptive approach to interpretation, in which the different pragmatic and semantic factors are conceived as presumptions that can be overcome by stronger ones or contextual evidence.