Analysis of Taliban Peace Negotiations Through Asymmetric Negotiation Theory

Abstract Following the US military intervention in 2001, the Taliban regime was overthrown and excluded from the negotiation process. Despite this, it continued to see itself as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. It accused the new Afghan government, which received the support of the international community and the US, of being a puppet government. However, the Taliban's approach to the Afghan government has undergone a significant transformation from denial in 2001 to indirect acceptance and negotiations in the 2020s. These negotiations, in which the US was both a mediator and a party, failed due to fundamental problems such as the lack of guarantees of neutrality and the exclusion of the Afghan government. Despite the end of the US withdrawal process from Afghanistan, a sustainable peace could not be established at the end of the negotiation process. The Taliban used the negotiations strategically and took full control of Afghanistan. This situation made the failure of the negotiations inevitable. The asymmetric negotiation theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for understanding the US-Taliban negotiations, as there is a power asymmetry and different goals between the parties. While the strong party in the negotiations, the US, made strategic mistakes by focusing on its short-term interests, the weak party, the Taliban, implemented a time-bending strategy and gained control over Afghanistan in the long term. The Taliban's move to a strong position in the negotiations after the withdrawal led to significant changes in the roles and influences of other regional actors, changing the regional balance of power. During this period, countries such as Pakistan, China and Russia reshaped their relations with the Taliban, while the international community's approach to Afghanistan also partially transformed. The Taliban's efforts to gain legitimacy continue. Keywords: Afghanistan, Asymmetric Negotiations, Doha Peace Talks, Regional Balance of Power, Taliban