Sequential Cursed Equilibrium

We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players who neglect information from hypothetical events but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005) and allows that players can be cursed about endogenous information. (JEL C73, D44, D71, D81, D83, D91)

Publication Details

Journal
American Economic Review
Published
2026-02-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20230309
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Sequential Cursed Equilibrium

American Economic Review
Game Theory and Applications
article

Sequential Cursed Equilibrium

article en

Abstract

We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players who neglect information from hypothetical events but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005) and allows that players can be cursed about endogenous information. (JEL C73, D44, D71, D81, D83, D91)

American Economic ReviewVol. 116(3)
Openalex Percentile: Top 46%
Game Theory and Applications
DOISourceOpenAlex
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