Anthropological perspectives on attributing beliefs cross-culturally

How legitimate is it to discuss the “beliefs” of different societies? How do anthropologists, well-versed in socio-cultural diversity, view the cognitive scientific goal of establishing natural kind(s) around the concept of “belief”? In short, it depends on the type of anthropologist one asks. This chapter discusses the social and cognitive anthropologies of religion. Most social anthropologists of religion would argue that while there may well be something belief-like going on in the minds and speech of peoples across the world, the English term “belief” will mislead more than it illuminates and any attempt to establish a natural kind across these diverse cases will be influenced by the cultural backgrounds and assumptions of those doing the establishing. For most social anthropologists of religion, then, attributing “beliefs” cross-culturally is fraught with peril and must be done very carefully, if at all. Cognitive anthropologists of religion, on the other hand, have a more sanguine view of the prospects of a cross-culturally applicable cognitive science of belief and are actively working to participate in the wider effort to further our scientific understanding of belief(s). Their relative optimism is a result of their following Dan Sperber and others in naturalising such concepts as “belief” and “religion.” Through naturalisation and fractionation, they argue, they can avoid the problems identified by their social anthropological counterparts. While these subfields differ on the prospects of a cross-culturally valid study of belief, both provide the enterprise valuable cautions, insights, and evidence.