Zetetic norms and the normative autonomy of logic

In the current literature the issue of the normativity of logic is usually understood as whether logic is autonomously normative, i.e., whether logic provides norms for reasoning over and above the demands of more general epistemic norms. This is generally taken to be a binary question: either logic is autonomously normative or it is not. In the present paper, I provide a more nuanced answer. Against the background of current work on epistemic and zetetic norms, I distinguish between different normative roles coming to logic: On the one hand, logic provides ideal standards for the synchronic evaluation of doxastic states. These norms operate alongside traditional epistemic norms such as evidentialism. On the other hand, facts of logical entailment provide guidance for deductive inferences as part of inquiries. As such these norms are zetetic. Once this distinction is sufficiently appreciated, the issue of the normative autonomy of logic bifurcates. In particular, so I argue, the arguments against the normative autonomy of logic in the literature are only successful as far as an evaluative normative role of logic is concerned. However, when it comes to the role of logic as guiding deductive inference in inquiry, a strong case is to be made in favour of logic being autonomously normative.