Study on distributed photovoltaic and energy storage cooperation with government participation: based on a tripartite evolutionary game model

To improve the utilization efficiency of renewable energy, energy storage has been promoted by various countries due to its advantages, but whether to equip energy storage has also become an issue for investors to consider. This study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model based on distributed photovoltaic (PV) investors, energy storage service providers, and the government, analyzed the dynamic behavior strategies and evolutionary stability of the three parties, and conducted numerical simulations based on this model to examine how various factors affect the behavior strategies of participants. The research findings indicate that governments will relax regulations, granting distributed PV and energy storage service providers greater autonomy to decide whether and how to collaborate based on market conditions. Energy storage service providers are more willing to collaborate with distributed PV, but when energy storage service costs exceed a certain threshold, they may abandon collaboration based on their own interests. The level of energy storage lease fees and the potential for high returns on surplus electricity have a significant impact on the cooperation preferences of distributed photovoltaic investors. Based on the research findings, recommendations for optimizing government regulatory policies and energy storage service providers' business strategies are proposed. • A Tripartite evolutionary game between the government, photovoltaic investors, and energy storage service providers. • Energy storage lease fees and surplus electricity sales revenue significantly influence the strategies of parties. • In most cases, the government will choose not to regulate based on its own interests when the equilibrium evolves. • Investors are more sensitive to penalty for breach of contract than energy storage service providers. • The government's regulatory measures have little impact on the choices of the other two parties' strategies.