The dark side of defection: security force defectors and the aftermath of nonviolent revolutions

Abstract When do nonviolent revolutions result in stable democratic regimes? Existing scholarship is optimistic about the positive relationship between nonviolent revolutionary transitions and postrevolutionary democracy. However, several regimes established following nonviolent revolutions fail to consolidate into democracy, often being derailed by coups and civil wars. Nevertheless, we know comparatively little about when and why nonviolent revolutions lead to unstable or undemocratic regimes. I theorize that security force defection during nonviolent revolutions undermines stability and democratic consolidation in the regimes that follow. Security force defectors possess distinctive motives, opportunities, and coercive capabilities that equip them to destabilize democracy in the postrevolutionary era. Empirical analysis using global data capturing nonviolent revolutions from 1945 to 2013 reveals that security force defection both significantly increases the likelihood of postrevolutionary coups and civil wars and diminishes the democratic character of postrevolutionary regimes. This article thereby revises the scholarly consensus regarding the benefits of security force defection during nonviolent revolutionary movements.