Hermeneutic Negativism

In this paper, I propose “hermeneutic negativism” as the methodology that begins from the idea that a positive account of understanding and interpretation can depart from their negative manifestations. By critically analyzing interpretive malfunctions, one can arrive at a more accurate and substantive picture of what understanding entails. The core idea of negativism, then, is that in certain cases, positive description presupposes insights drawn from breakdowns or failures. The paper offers an overview of major hermeneutic positions in light of methodological negativism. A key strength of this approach lies in its phenomenological character: rather than constructing models based on preconceived notions or unexplained assumptions, the description derives its plausibility from the critique of the negative. As ideal-typical poles of this contrast, I examine the hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Hans-Georg Gadamer, respectively. It can be shown that, in the former, misunderstanding is taken for granted and understanding requires explanation, whereas, in the latter, misunderstanding is derived from failures of understanding. I argue that Gadamer’s hermeneutics aligns more closely with hermeneutic negativism. Furthermore, I defend the claim that understanding can only proceed through the ongoing attempt to avoid misunderstanding.