SEVERAL LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS AS THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY IN MODERN FEDERALISM

This paper explores the legal foundations necessary for ensuring constitutional stability in modern federal systems. Federalism, as a system of governance, requires a well-defined distribution of powers between central and subnational governments, supported by a clear legal hierarchy and mechanisms to resolve jurisdictional conflicts. The coexistence of two parallel legal orders, necessitates structured mechanisms to maintain legal coherence, prevent conflicts, and uphold constitutional supremacy. The study examines key principles that contribute to federal stability, including the supremacy of the constitution, the hierarchy of legal acts, and judicial review as a mechanism for resolving legal disputes. It analyzes two primary approaches for addressing conflicts between federal and state laws: the primacy of federal law and judicial review as an enforcement mechanism. Additionally, the paper highlights the role of constitutional courts in adjudicating disputes over legislative and executive competences, emphasizing their function in preserving the federal balance. Further, the paper explores the right of federal entities to initiate review of constitutionality of federal laws, comparing systems where this right is explicitly granted, with those where it is restricted. Finally, it addresses jurisdictional conflicts both among federal entities and between federal and subnational governments, demonstrating how constitutional courts serve as arbiters in resolving such disputes. Ultimately, the paper argues that federal systems require a combination of legal hierarchy, judicial enforcement, and institutional checks and balances to function effectively. By ensuring compliance with constitutional norms, preventing excessive centralization or fragmentation, and maintaining a structured conflict-resolution framework, these mechanisms contribute to the long-term stability and coherence of federal governance.