The Override of Presidential Vetoes by the Peruvian Congress: Using Comparative Law to Derive a Proposal for Solving a Domestic Problem

Abstract A healthy democracy depends on a balanced relationship between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. When this balance is lost, political instability often follows. Peru’s recent history shows how weakened checks and balances can undermine democratic governance. Since the return to democracy in 2000, Congress has repeatedly removed presidents from office and has overridden presidential vetoes. These actions challenge the idea that Peru’s political system is dominated by a strong executive and instead reveal the growing power of Congress. This article examines one key congressional tool: the ability to override a presidential veto through a process known as approval by insistence. Originally designed as an exceptional measure, this mechanism has increasingly been used as a regular political strategy, even when the Executive raises serious technical or constitutional objections. The result has been poorly designed legislation, a weaker separation of powers, and greater political instability. Using comparative examples from the United States (US) and Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica, this article explores possible reforms to limit the abuse of this power, with the goal of helping to restore balance within Peru’s democratic system.