Kant's conception of virtue

This thesis examines Kant’s conception of virtue and the role it plays in his moral theory. In chapter one, I elucidate Kant’s conception of virtue as the strength of our innate capacity to act morally in the face of contrary inclinations. I also show how his other characterisations of virtue as a disposition, as self-constraint, as a free aptitude, and as self-control relate to this central notion of strength. In chapter two, I consider what it means for virtue to be an unattainable ‘ideal’. In calling virtue an ideal, Kant cannot quite mean that moral strength is itself an ideal, for strength is something we can attain, at least to some degree. I show that his claim that virtue is an ideal is instead best understood as an epistemic claim that we cannot and should not assume we have attained ‘perfect’ virtue, or the stability of holiness. I then show that this epistemic claim in fact presupposes his more fundamental claim that it is holiness that is our moral ideal, i.e., the ideal the virtuous person aims at. I also bring out and clarify how dread and cheerfulness, as well as humility and confidence, figure in the life of the virtuous person striving towards this ideal. The final chapter then turns to the question of how we make progress towards holiness. In particular, I highlight and attempt to explain the mysterious role of ‘practice’ in strengthening our capacity for virtue. I argue that practice makes virtue by engendering moral self-respect and confidence in our own improving capacity for virtue. Overall, I explicate Kant’s picture of virtue as endless progress towards holiness. Always rising, yet always fallen, never a God.