Moral Assumptions in Causal Thought: Poverty and Perversity

ABSTRACT Causal attributions, framings, and ideas shape moral judgments. Sociologists have long highlighted these causality‐to‐morality processes, showing how causality underpins blame and moral responsibility. The reverse process of morality‐to‐causality, where moral assumptions influence causal attributions, has been studied less. Furthermore, the underlying mechanism of this second process remains largely unexplored. Drawing on philosophical research, I theorize this second entanglement of causality and morality and urge sociologists to investigate it empirically. Causal attributions do lead to moral judgments, but they in turn have hidden moral assumptions. I introduce the “normality horizon” as a conceptual tool to examine how moral assumptions shape causal thought. It comprises ontological and epistemological beliefs that allow individuals to select actual causes as opposed to background conditions. To demonstrate the utility of this concept, I apply it to mid‐19th‐century pauperism discourse in Switzerland, expanding analyses of the perversity thesis and welfare reform. Analyzing economic, political, and clerical writings reveals a shared normality horizon differentiating natural from unnatural phenomena. These results show that market fundamentalist and religious perspectives on welfare policy rested on similar underlying assumptions.