Procedural Pluralism and the MPIA Role in WTO Dispute Governance

Paralysis of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body (AB) has prompted institutional innovation within the WTO dispute settlement system, most notably through the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). Grounded in Article 25 of the DSU, the MPIA serves as a stop-gap mechanism to preserve appellate reviews. This article critically examines the legality, functionality, and systemic implications of appellate arbitration as a quasi-permanent alternative to AB. Drawing on treaty interpretation principles under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), this analysis examines whether Article 25 legitimately supports appellate functions and evaluates jurisprudential consistency, procedural efficiency, and systemic resilience. It argues that while appellate arbitration introduces flexibility and party autonomy into WTO adjudication, its legal foundation remains contested and its selective adoption risks fragmenting the multilateral system. Nonetheless, appellate arbitration, if institutionalized with clearer procedural norms and broader participation, could complement AB reform efforts and enhance the adaptability of the WTO legal order. This article contributes to the debate on WTO dispute settlement reform by mapping the evolving role of arbitration in maintaining rule-based trade governance amid the geopolitical deadlock.