The Incentive Virtues of Performance‐Based Trade Allowances and Loss Leading
ABSTRACT A retailer can boost demand for a manufacturer's product through non‐verifiable activities. Performance‐based trade allowances—rebates conditional on the retailer's successful sales efforts—help mitigate this moral hazard problem. In equilibrium, the wholesale contract includes a retail price set below cost, complemented by a rebate for incremental units purchased when efforts successfully increase sales. Loss leading thus emerges as an incentive mechanism, rather than a practice driven by anti‐competitive or exploitative intent. A ban on below‐cost pricing leads to higher retail prices and reduced promotional efforts.
Authors
- Jérôme Pouyet (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3751-1552)
- David Martimort
Institutions
- École Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales (FR)
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Toulouse School of Economics (FR)
- CY Cergy Paris Université (FR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Industrial Economics
- Published
- 2026-09-11
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70045
- Primary Topic
- Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00