The Paradox of Power in Turkey: Omnipotent Leader, Impotent State

Abstract This article examines a central paradox of contemporary authoritarianism: how the concentration of power in the hands of a seemingly omnipotent executive can simultaneously erode bureaucratic capacity and autonomy through subordination, producing an increasingly impotent state. Focussing on Turkey's transition to hyper‐presidentialism after the 2018 elections, it argues that excessive centralisation has undermined the institutional competence and discretion required for coordinated and effective policy implementation. The government's response to the 6 February 2023 twin earthquakes provides a tragic and revealing case that affected millions of lives. Despite Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's pledges that the presidential system would deliver efficiency and decisiveness, disaster governance was marked by delayed decision making, poor coordination, limited capacity for rapid mobilisation and communication and an emphasis on narrative control over effective execution. Drawing on bureaucratic capacity and autonomy as indicators of governance quality, this article shows how personalist rule hollows out state institutions, exposing its limits in delivering good governance.