Neorealism and the United Nations Security Council: The Syrian Conflict (2011–2024) as a Test Case for Mearsheimer's Theory of Institutional Instrumentalisation

AbstractThis working paper examines the paralysis of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) over the Syrian conflict between 2011 and 2024 through the theoretical lens of neorealist international relations theory, and in particular through the offensive-realist cri- tique of international institutions advanced by John J. Mearsheimer. Drawing on a qualitative, deductive single-case study design with process-analytical elements, the paper eva-luates whether the voting behaviour of the five permanent members (P5) and above all the systematic use of the veto by Russia and China, is consistent with Mearsheimer's central claim that international institutions do not exercise independent causal power but merely reflect the underlying distribution of power among great states. The empirical evidence consists of the complete record of UNSC resolutions on Syria (2011–2024), official verba-tim meeting records, and secondary literature on Russian and Western strategic interests in the region. Of nineteen draft resolutions considered, eighteen were vetoed, exclusively by Russia, often jointly with China, while the sole binding resolution adopted contained onlythe most general provisions. The paper shows that this pattern constitutes strong indicative support for both hypotheses derived from Mearsheimer's framework: (H1) that great powers deploy veto rights deliberately to prevent relative gains by competing states, and (H2)that the UNSC is rendered institutionally incapable of enforcing humanitarian norms whe- never those norms conflict with the strategic interests of a permanent member. The paper concludes by acknowledging the explanatory limits of structural neorealism and brieflyengaging liberal and constructivist counterarguments, before posing normative questions about possible reform of the veto system.