Anxiety and Evidence
ABSTRACT When does an agent possess a proposition P as evidence? According to Timothy Williamson, the answer is when, and only when, they know that P . Call this view E = K. In this article, I point out an unwanted consequence of E = K, which is that people who suffer from anxiety have impoverished empirical evidence due to their anxiety. Although anxiety can manifest in a variety of ways and to different degrees, I take it that in some cases a person's anxiety functions in a way that prevents a person from believing in accordance with their empirical evidence. However, E = K has trouble explaining the descriptive and normative dimensions of a case like this, because the view implies that whenever an agent's anxiety prevents them from outright believing a proposition this ipso facto deprives them of empirical evidence.
Authors
- Rhys Borchert (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4588-8758)
Institutions
- Universität Greifswald (DE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Philosophical Issues
- Published
- 2025-10-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70001
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00