But Don't Play With Me `Cause You're Playing With a Farmer – Electoral Consequences of Proposed Animal Welfare Reforms in Rural Poland

ABSTRACT It has long been recognized that reforming agricultural policies can be challenging. One of the key obstacles is the risk of dissatisfaction among rural voters and the potential loss of electoral support. In this paper, we demonstrate that such political costs may arise not only from policy reforms that are actually implemented, but also from reform proposals that are put forward but never enacted. We illustrate this with an example from Poland, where, in 2020, the government attempted to reform animal welfare regulations. The proposed law was highly unpopular among farmers, sparked numerous protests, and was ultimately not passed. We provide evidence that, despite the withdrawal of the reform, the governing party suffered a significant decline in support among the rural electorate in the first elections following the attempt, and that this decline was more pronounced in municipalities where livestock production was relatively more important. The interpretation that the party's poorer performance in rural areas may have been due to the animal welfare proposals is further supported by several robustness tests.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Agricultural Economics
Published
2026-02-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.70094
Primary Topic
Agricultural Economics and Policy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

But Don't Play With Me `Cause You're Playing With a Farmer – Electoral Consequences of Proposed Animal Welfare Reforms in Rural Poland

Karol Degórski, Jan Fałkowski
Agricultural Economics
Agricultural Economics and Policy
article

But Don't Play With Me `Cause You're Playing With a Farmer – Electoral Consequences of Proposed Animal Welfare Reforms in Rural Poland

Karol Degórski, Jan Fałkowski
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT It has long been recognized that reforming agricultural policies can be challenging. One of the key obstacles is the risk of dissatisfaction among rural voters and the potential loss of electoral support. In this paper, we demonstrate that such political costs may arise not only from policy reforms that are actually implemented, but also from reform proposals that are put forward but never enacted. We illustrate this with an example from Poland, where, in 2020, the government attempted to reform animal welfare regulations. The proposed law was highly unpopular among farmers, sparked numerous protests, and was ultimately not passed. We provide evidence that, despite the withdrawal of the reform, the governing party suffered a significant decline in support among the rural electorate in the first elections following the attempt, and that this decline was more pronounced in municipalities where livestock production was relatively more important. The interpretation that the party's poorer performance in rural areas may have been due to the animal welfare proposals is further supported by several robustness tests.

Agricultural EconomicsVol. 57(2)
University of Warsaw (PL)
Uniwersytet Warszawski
No poverty
Openalex Percentile: Top 51%
Agricultural Economics and Policy
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.