‘Friendshoring’ the seabed: Securing submarine cables through network centrality

Abstract As the conduit for approximately 99 per cent of digital communications globally, submarine cables are the backbone of the internet and modern digital societies. Amid global strategic competition, submarine cable network security has emerged as a central concern for states, ushering in a distinctive era of geopolitical-economic competition over these seabed networks. This paper focuses attention on state intervention in the form of ‘friendshoring’, which has increasingly dictated the control of information flows through submarine cable networks. A term that emerged during the Biden administration, ‘friendshoring’ refers to how states encourage firms to shift trade and supply chain networks to countries that are viewed as sharing political values. Using the Coral Sea Cable System, the East Micronesia Cable System, and Palau Spur Cable as case studies, this paper illuminates how and why these so-called like-minded states have sought to develop collective control of submarine cable networks – what we describe as ‘network centrality’ – by excluding ‘unfriendly’ states from the development of seabed cable networks in an increasingly contested maritime region. While states seek to ‘friendshore’ the seabed to reduce geopolitical and economic risks and enhance influence in smaller countries, the practice contributes to reifying strategic competition and global economy bifurcation.