Pseudoscience: epistemic management, cultural mimicry, and virtue epistemology

Abstract The epistemic strategies of a set of peer-reviewed articles on homeopathy and psychoanalysis are examined from the perspectives of virtue epistemology and cultural mimicry to explore the aptitude of these two science-theoretical notions as tools for diagnosing pseudoscientific behavior. Cultural mimicry, according to Boudry, is the hallmark of pseudoscience: it is the pretense of epistemic warrant through spurious evidence and avoiding counterevidence. In the text sample, inadequate epistemic strategies like the use of undefined technical terminology, unwarranted claims, and conjectural argumentation can be observed, but it seems difficult to classify these behaviors as clearly pseudoscientific rather than merely careless. More research into objective measures for epistemic behavior is needed. Ultimately, it might only be possible to decide on the pseudoscientific status of a theory or a discipline by longitudinal scrutiny. From the perspective of virtue epistemology, the mapped flaws in epistemic management could point to vices like dishonesty, epistemic arrogance, and lack of epistemic integrity in out-group communication (most homeopathy articles), and closed-mindedness or intellectual gullibility in in-group communication (most psychoanalysis articles). However, due to the direction of inference, virtue epistemology seems less apt to serve as a diagnostic tool for concrete epistemic behavior.