Identifying Street‐Level Bureaucrats' Preference for Blame Avoidance in Risk Situations: A Study Using the Q Methodology

ABSTRACT The issue of the blame avoidance preferences of street‐level bureaucrats derived from risk societies is a significant and complex topic that has been largely overlooked in both practical and theoretical discourse. To gain insight into the blame avoidance preferences of street‐level bureaucrats in a high‐risk context, this study employs a representative sample of grassroots community cadres involved in epidemic prevention and control during the COVID‐19 pandemic. By utilizing the Q methodology, the study identifies and reveals types of blame avoidance preferences of street‐level bureaucrats in a high‐risk context and the corresponding facilitating conditions, and come up with the following results: (1) the cover‐up preference tends to rely on information superiority and eliminate accountability risks by manipulating information; (2) the dilution preference tends to rely on the collective and reduce accountability risks by dispersing or transferring responsibilities; (3) the precautionary preference emphasizes prospective risk control and tends to avoid accountability risks by strictly following the rules and intervening in advance. These three types of preferences reflect the different strategies employed by street‐level bureaucrats to cope with accountability pressure in high‐risk situations, highlighting the diversity and complexity of their blame avoidance behaviors; (4) although these three types of blame avoidance preferences aim at self‐protection and have similar implementation conditions and sources of stimulation, they differ in terms of strategies, means, attributions, timings, and contextual applicability.