Basing on Absences

ABSTRACT When what justifies you in believing a proposition is some evidence you have, you are doxastically justified only if you believe that proposition on the basis of that evidence. According to causal theories of basing, this basing relation must be a causal relation. In this article, we discuss the role that defeaters play in an account of this kind. We first argue that doxastic justification for believing a certain proposition requires, not just basing the belief on evidence that one has and that is sufficient to propositionally justify the belief, but also being sensitive to the absence of sufficiently weighty defeaters. We then argue that causal theories of basing have the right kinds of resources to incorporate this role played by defeaters (and the relevant role played by disqualifiers) in the concept of doxastic justification. Our argument borrows from action theory in that it is inspired by similar arguments on behalf of causalist accounts of action and freedom. We end with a discussion of the bearing of our view on Pryor's dogmatism.