Why Did They Take on Difficult Cases? Judicial Entrepreneurship in Bankruptcy Enforcement in Wenzhou, China

This article examines the incentives, strategies, and constraints faced by judicial entrepreneurs in advancing bankruptcy enforcement—a legal area traditionally considered politically sensitive—in Wenzhou, China. While existing studies on Chinese courts emphasize external and institutional factors, this study argues that judicial entrepreneurs can play a pivotal role in driving reforms. In response to the 2011 private lending crisis, Wenzhou court leaders promoted bankruptcy as a means of resolving failing firms. They began with pilot cases and gradually institutionalized bankruptcy by mobilizing social, judicial, and political resources. These efforts were shaped by both personal attributes and self-serving interests. However, judicial entrepreneurship encountered limits, such as legal rules, the inconsistency of enforcement, and the government’s core interests. The study contributes to the debates on courts and social change by showing how court leaders can overcome institutional constraints through alliance building, public engagement, and local adaptation of national rules. It also enriches our understanding of judicial policymaking across regimes by highlighting a symbiotic, rather than a zero-sum, state-court relationship in the analysis of judicial politics.