Training as a club good: Merchant apprenticeship in sixteenth‐century Europe

Abstract Based on the extensive correspondence of the sixteenth‐century merchant firm of Tucher, this article casts pre‐modern mercantile training in a new light. Rather than training for seven or more years with one master, including a possible sojourn abroad, apprentices served a string of short‐term contracts with masters across different European countries. This form of organization raised the cost of training significantly. I argue that participants bore these costs because apprenticeship served a purpose beyond the transmission of skills. The network‐based nature of trade meant that firms could expect to retain their investment in training through future business ties with the former apprentice. Over the course of the apprenticeship, reputation mechanisms served to vet the apprentice's suitability as a future trading partner. Under these circumstances, training became a club good. It facilitated network expansion and contributed to solving the fundamental problem of exchange.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Economic History Review
Published
2026-02-09
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.70091
Primary Topic
Historical Economic and Social Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Training as a club good: Merchant apprenticeship in sixteenth‐century Europe

Esther Sahle
The Economic History Review
Historical Economic and Social Studies
article

Training as a club good: Merchant apprenticeship in sixteenth‐century Europe

Esther Sahle
article en

Abstract

Abstract Based on the extensive correspondence of the sixteenth‐century merchant firm of Tucher, this article casts pre‐modern mercantile training in a new light. Rather than training for seven or more years with one master, including a possible sojourn abroad, apprentices served a string of short‐term contracts with masters across different European countries. This form of organization raised the cost of training significantly. I argue that participants bore these costs because apprenticeship served a purpose beyond the transmission of skills. The network‐based nature of trade meant that firms could expect to retain their investment in training through future business ties with the former apprentice. Over the course of the apprenticeship, reputation mechanisms served to vet the apprentice's suitability as a future trading partner. Under these circumstances, training became a club good. It facilitated network expansion and contributed to solving the fundamental problem of exchange.

The Economic History Review
Sax Institute (AU)
Openalex Percentile: Top 66%
Historical Economic and Social Studies
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