Fallibility and Infallibility in Heidegger's and Aristotle's Conception of <i>Phronesis</i>

ABSTRACT In a recent paper, Dimitris Vardoulakis (2022b) criticises Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotelian phronesis by explaining how it conflates several important distinctions Aristotle makes concerning phronesis and techne and thus how it glosses over phronesis' intrinsic fallibility. My main contention with Vardoulakis' critique is that it is not entirely sensitive to Heidegger's own epistemological leanings that may be informing said interpretation, and to how they are not necessarily anathema to a differently construed kind of phronetic fallibility, one based not on a fallible calculability of final ends by instrumental ones but on a categorical distinction between different kinds of disclosures. So even if Vardoulakis is accurate in assessing that Heideggerian phronesis requires the calculability of ends to be the sole jurisdiction of techne, this fails to show that phronetic fallibility itself requires a calculability of its own ends.