A Note on Approximating Weighted Nash Social Welfare with Additive Valuations

We give the first $O(1)$-approximation for the weighted Nash Social Welfare problem with additive valuations. The approximation ratio we obtain is $e^{1/e} + ε\approx 1.445 + ε$, which matches the best known approximation ratio for the unweighted case. Both our algorithm and analysis are simple. We solve a natural configuration LP for the problem, and obtain the allocation of items to agents using a randomized version of the Shmoys-Tardos rounding algorithm developed for unrelated machine scheduling problems. In the analysis, we show that the approximation ratio of the algorithm is at most the worst gap between the Nash social welfare of the optimum allocation and that of an EF1 allocation, for an unweighted Nash Social Welfare instance with identical additive valuations. This was shown to be at most $e^{1/e} \approx 1.445$ by Barman, Krishnamurthy and Vaish, leading to our approximation ratio. 12 pages. This is the TheoretiCS journal version

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
TheoretiCS
Published
2025-08-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.46298/theoretics.25.17
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

A Note on Approximating Weighted Nash Social Welfare with Additive Valuations

Yuda Feng, Shi Li
TheoretiCS
Game Theory and Voting Systems
article

A Note on Approximating Weighted Nash Social Welfare with Additive Valuations

Yuda Feng, Shi Li
article en

Abstract

We give the first $O(1)$-approximation for the weighted Nash Social Welfare problem with additive valuations. The approximation ratio we obtain is $e^{1/e} + ε\approx 1.445 + ε$, which matches the best known approximation ratio for the unweighted case. Both our algorithm and analysis are simple. We solve a natural configuration LP for the problem, and obtain the allocation of items to agents using a randomized version of the Shmoys-Tardos rounding algorithm developed for unrelated machine scheduling problems. In the analysis, we show that the approximation ratio of the algorithm is at most the worst gap between the Nash social welfare of the optimum allocation and that of an EF1 allocation, for an unweighted Nash Social Welfare instance with identical additive valuations. This was shown to be at most $e^{1/e} \approx 1.445$ by Barman, Krishnamurthy and Vaish, leading to our approximation ratio. 12 pages. This is the TheoretiCS journal version

TheoretiCSVol. Volume 4
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 13%
Game Theory and Voting Systems
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

A Note on Approximating Weighted Nash Social Welfare with Additive Valuations — Yuda Feng, Shi Li · TheoretiCS (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS