Designing Deliberative Lobbying: Three Institutional Solutions for an Open Lobby Democracy

Abstract Debates on lobbying regulation have focused overwhelmingly on transparency, yet disclosure alone does little to address the deeper democratic challenges of unequal power, narrow representation and public distrust. This article argues that lobbying regulation should be designed not only to make influence visible, but also to make it fairer and more deliberative. Drawing on deliberative democracy, this article develops the concept of an open lobby democracy, proposing three institutional solutions: a register of interested parties to map the full range of stakeholders, a digital deliberative platform to structure exchanges between groups and policy makers and a policy footprint to document and justify decisions in light of prior deliberation. This framework preserves policy makers’ ultimate authority while ensuring more accountable, reasoned and legitimate decisions. By reframing lobbying regulation as a tool for deliberative renewal, this article contributes to ongoing debates on how to mend democracy in times of distrust and complex policy‐making challenges.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Political Quarterly
Published
2026-02-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923x.70053
Primary Topic
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Designing Deliberative Lobbying: Three Institutional Solutions for an Open Lobby Democracy

Alberto Bitonti
The Political Quarterly
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
article

Designing Deliberative Lobbying: Three Institutional Solutions for an Open Lobby Democracy

Alberto Bitonti
article en

Abstract

Abstract Debates on lobbying regulation have focused overwhelmingly on transparency, yet disclosure alone does little to address the deeper democratic challenges of unequal power, narrow representation and public distrust. This article argues that lobbying regulation should be designed not only to make influence visible, but also to make it fairer and more deliberative. Drawing on deliberative democracy, this article develops the concept of an open lobby democracy, proposing three institutional solutions: a register of interested parties to map the full range of stakeholders, a digital deliberative platform to structure exchanges between groups and policy makers and a policy footprint to document and justify decisions in light of prior deliberation. This framework preserves policy makers’ ultimate authority while ensuring more accountable, reasoned and legitimate decisions. By reframing lobbying regulation as a tool for deliberative renewal, this article contributes to ongoing debates on how to mend democracy in times of distrust and complex policy‐making challenges.

The Political Quarterly
Università della Svizzera italiana (CH)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 66%
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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