A bonus and penalty mechanism as an incentive for cybersecurity investments

Cyber insurance was expected to incentivise stronger self-protection by rewarding improved cybersecurity with lower premiums. However, theoretical results show that rational insureds often reduce their cyber investment, relying instead on coverage. In critical infrastructure (CI), this dynamic is particularly problematic, as it heightens cyber risk across supply chains. Effective cyber risk mitigation requires oversight of cybersecurity among all partners. Existing mechanisms to incentivise investment largely depend on insureds’ honesty or access to sensitive data. This paper proposes a simple-to-implement bonus–penalty mechanism that requires only cyber incident occurrence status, no incident history, and is intended for deployment by the state or large CI organisations. We analyse the separate effects of penalties and bonuses on cyber investment, comparing scenarios with and without cyber insurance under a constant absolute risk aversion utility framework and a generic probability function. We assess the mechanism’s ability to prevent the self-protection drop associated with cyber insurance coverage. Numerical examples illustrate and support the theoretical findings.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Information Security
Published
2026-02-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-025-01192-z
Primary Topic
Information and Cyber Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

A bonus and penalty mechanism as an incentive for cybersecurity investments

Artsiom Yautsiukhin, Natallia Kavalionak
International Journal of Information Security
Information and Cyber Security
article

A bonus and penalty mechanism as an incentive for cybersecurity investments

Artsiom Yautsiukhin, Natallia Kavalionak
article en

Abstract

Cyber insurance was expected to incentivise stronger self-protection by rewarding improved cybersecurity with lower premiums. However, theoretical results show that rational insureds often reduce their cyber investment, relying instead on coverage. In critical infrastructure (CI), this dynamic is particularly problematic, as it heightens cyber risk across supply chains. Effective cyber risk mitigation requires oversight of cybersecurity among all partners. Existing mechanisms to incentivise investment largely depend on insureds’ honesty or access to sensitive data. This paper proposes a simple-to-implement bonus–penalty mechanism that requires only cyber incident occurrence status, no incident history, and is intended for deployment by the state or large CI organisations. We analyse the separate effects of penalties and bonuses on cyber investment, comparing scenarios with and without cyber insurance under a constant absolute risk aversion utility framework and a generic probability function. We assess the mechanism’s ability to prevent the self-protection drop associated with cyber insurance coverage. Numerical examples illustrate and support the theoretical findings.

International Journal of Information SecurityVol. 25(2)
Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IT)
European Commission
Industry, innovation and infrastructure
Openalex Percentile: Top 75%
Information and Cyber Security
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.