Beyond Physics and Metaphysics Epistemics and the Differentiation of Reality into Subjective, Intersubjective, and Functional-Empirical Physics

The classical distinction between physics and metaphysics has become increasingly inadequate for describing contemporary epistemic practice. While empirical physics is often treated as the sole standard of what counts as real, subjective experience and social order are either reduced or relegated to a vague metaphysical remainder. This paper proposes an alternative ordering. Starting from an epistemic clarification, reality is not understood as a unified domain of objects, but as a structured configuration of distinct physics of stability: a subjective physics of experience, an intersubjective physics of social order, and an empirical physics of scientific law-governed regularities. These physics are neither hierarchical nor mutually reducible; each follows its own mechanisms of stabilization and boundary formation. Epistemics functions as a meta-framework that specifies the conditions under which different forms of reality can be identified, tested, and assessed. Within this framework, friction is analyzed as a necessary boundary signal that renders limited robustness visible and thereby constitutes a condition of order and meaning. Friction does not merely indicate boundary stress; it operates as a selection mechanism. Because different models, orders, or stability claims generate different costs under strain, certain structures are stabilized over time while others are discarded. In this way, core functions traditionally assigned to metaphysics are fulfilled with greater precision, without recourse to ultimate ontological claims.