Ministerial Instability and Autocratic Regimes: The Case of Argentina

Abstract This article investigates ministerial instability within autocratic regimes, with a particular focus on the case of Argentina. Using an original dataset on ministerial tenures in four key portfolios – Economy, Education, Foreign Affairs and Health – across seven Latin American countries between 1945 and 2020, we show that, in contrast to broader regional patterns, Argentina’s military governments experienced exceptionally high levels of cabinet turnover. Applying Kaplan–Meier survival analysis and process-tracing methods, we examine two critical autocratic periods: the Argentine Revolution (1966–73) and the National Reorganisation Process (1976–83). Our findings reveal that political fragmentation, intensified by the incorporation of competing civilian actors and complex institutional arrangements, undermined ministerial stability. Through detailed case studies of El Cordobazo and Law No. 21.431, we demonstrate that a fragmented system of rule, rather than inter-branch military rivalries or formal institutional designs, accounts for the instability observed. This study challenges prevailing assumptions that autocracies are more likely to maintain bureaucratic continuity and contributes to a broader understanding of elite competition and internal dynamics within authoritarian regimes.