The Adaptive Stability of the European Union's Long‐Term Budget

Abstract This article examines the adaptive stability of the European Union's long‐term budget from the Delors I package of 1988–1992 to the Multiannual Financial Framework of 2014–2020, focusing on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Building on incrementalism, punctuated equilibrium, historical institutionalism and rational choice coalition theories, we propose the theory of Adaptive Budget Stability. To examine the explanatory value of the theory, we analyse quantitative data on national contributions and allocations from 1987 to 2020 to calculate Net Budget Balances, followed by a K‐means cluster analysis to identify potential coalitions. Our findings reveal that funding for CAP is more stable due to the consistent support from major net contributors. Conversely, Cohesion Policy is more prone to reform as no major net contributor maintains a long‐term interest in preserving it.