Democratic Control over Tax Treaties: A Comparative Constitutional Perspective

The article asks a fundamental constitutional question: who democratically controls tax treaty policy? Using a functional, life cycle-based comparative method, it examines four pivotal moments at which representative consent may shape or limit tax treaty commitments: (i) entry (negotiation and approval); (ii) clarification (reservations, subsequent agreements, interpretative practice); (iii) operation (domestic implementation and application, including override); (iv) and exit (termination). Although tax treaties reallocate taxing rights, reshape tax bases and affect public revenue, the comparative analysis of selected civil law and common law jurisdictions reveals a recurring pattern of executive dominance. Parliaments play a central but temporarily compressed role at approval or implementation, but they are only weakly integrated into the management and evolution of treaty commitments. This article maps emerging best practices and advances a reform agenda aimed at re-embedding tax treaties within domestic chains of democratic legitimacy, so that the principle of “no taxation without representation” applies coherently to both international tax commitment and ordinary tax legislation.