Academic freedom and free speech: threats, rights, limits and responsibilities

In recent years, universities, and indeed some governments, have instituted or revised policies relating to academic freedom and free speech. This has derived from, but also prompted, complaints about threats to the exercise of these rights. These complaints have come from diverse directions, from both the political Right and Left; albeit relying on very different assumptions about what should and should not be allowed. These two principles are frequently treated as if they were isomorphic, yet there is an important distinction to be drawn between them. Furthermore, there is often a lack of clarity about what kinds of action each allows, on the part of whom, in the various contexts to which they might be applied; and, therefore, about what limits are associated with them. There is also the question of what sort of tolerance they demand on the part of others. Finally, all rights imply obligations: thus, both academic freedom and freedom of speech impose responsibilities on those exercising them. In this article I will begin by examining recent complaints about breaches of these principles, and then go on to clarify what I take to be their character and implications. This will indicate what must be defended, as well as what cannot legitimately be defended, through appeals to academic freedom and freedom of speech, and the implications of this in present circumstances.