Playtika's platform problems: Theorizing and analyzing risk in digital platform economics

Risk is often an implicit theme in platform studies and is rarely made explicit in the analysis of platform power. The increased dependencies created by digital platforms and imposed on their complementors—the firms that provide the goods and services that attract users to digital platform ecosystems—can make risk harder to discern. Complementors like the game publisher Playtika that specialize in socially marginal commodities, like free-to-play gambling apps, make for a salient case study in how risk is built directly into the platform-complementor relationship. We use institutional analysis to conduct a close reading of Playtika's risk reporting in its financial disclosure documentation (e.g., annual reports) and investor relations communications, uncovering three distinct categories: financial risk, infrastructural risk, and regulatory risk. Taken together, this collection of institutional risks speaks to how platform governance places constraints on Playtika's business operations. We argue that risk is built directly into the complex operationalization of platform power, thus making it imperative to outline explicitly how it is differentiated between platforms and their complementors. Ultimately, we position Playtika's work to overcome institutional risks as representative of the volatile and asymmetrical power relations that shape the wider platform economy.