Wishocracy: Solving the Democratic Principal-Agent Problem Through Pairwise Preference Aggregation
Representative democracy suffers from an inescapable principal-agent problem where elected officials' incentives diverge from citizen welfare. Wishocracy introduces RAPPA (Randomized Aggregated Pairwise Preference Allocation), which aggregates citizen preferences through cognitively tractable pairwise comparisons and creates accountability via Citizen Alignment Scores that channel electoral resources toward politicians who actually represent what citizens want.
Authors
- Mike P. Sinn
Institutions
- Accelerated Medical Diagnostics (United States) (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-02-04
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18480097
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00