More Than “Just 1 <i>g</i> ”? The General Intelligence Paradox and Its Solution

Cattell–Horn–Carroll models of intelligence frequently show that, at the group-factor level, G f is most strongly related to g , whereas at the subtest level, G c -associated measures exhibit the highest g loadings. One proposed solution to this “ g paradox” holds that Stratum-III g and Stratum-II G f are identical, and that the sizeable g loadings of crystallized subtests merely reflect the investment of G f into learning. Investment theory is weakly evidenced, however. We argue that the “ g paradox” results from subtests measuring facets of G f exhibiting pronounced specificity for cognitive entities. Capturing everything that goes into G f is difficult on a single-measure basis, hence lower Stratum-I g loadings. The G f group factor is nonetheless reflective of the composite of these entities and therefore is uniquely (at Stratum II) associated with g . Subtests measuring G c broadly index the quality of global systems involving many cognitive processes, not entities, and so relate to factors that have formative effects on g , which are Stratum-I specific. We posit the existence of two distinguishable sources of general covariance: a formative g (associated primarily with G c ) and a reflective g (associated primarily with G f ), with the latter hierarchically superordinate to the former. Network analysis of “pure” psychometric measures of the G c and G f domains indicates that the former exhibits significantly greater network integrity than the latter, consistent with this formative/reflective model. Random effects meta-analysis of SEM contrast parameters, derived from four large genetically informed studies, finds that subtests assigned to a “ G c ” category are associated with higher-magnitude direct (formative) genetic paths relative to those in a “ G f ” category, suggesting a weak but discriminable and broad Stratum-I g in the residual covariance structure. Given the theorized phylogenetic histories of these two g s, we term the formative (“bottom-up”) g “proto g ” ( g p ), and the reflective (“top-down”) g “neo g ” ( g n ).

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Publication Details

Journal
Intelligence & Cognitive Abilities
Published
2026-02-04
DOI
https://doi.org/10.65550/001c.155379
Primary Topic
Cognitive Abilities and Testing
Type
article
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article

More Than “Just 1 g ”? The General Intelligence Paradox and Its Solution

Michael A. Woodley of Menie, Matthew A. Sarraf, John Fuerst, Mateo Peñaherrera‐Aguirre
Intelligence & Cognitive Abilities
Cognitive Abilities and Testing
article

More Than “Just 1 g ”? The General Intelligence Paradox and Its Solution

Michael A. Woodley of Menie, Matthew A. Sarraf, John Fuerst, Mateo Peñaherrera‐Aguirre
article en

Abstract

Cattell–Horn–Carroll models of intelligence frequently show that, at the group-factor level, G f is most strongly related to g , whereas at the subtest level, G c -associated measures exhibit the highest g loadings. One proposed solution to this “ g paradox” holds that Stratum-III g and Stratum-II G f are identical, and that the sizeable g loadings of crystallized subtests merely reflect the investment of G f into learning. Investment theory is weakly evidenced, however. We argue that the “ g paradox” results from subtests measuring facets of G f exhibiting pronounced specificity for cognitive entities. Capturing everything that goes into G f is difficult on a single-measure basis, hence lower Stratum-I g loadings. The G f group factor is nonetheless reflective of the composite of these entities and therefore is uniquely (at Stratum II) associated with g . Subtests measuring G c broadly index the quality of global systems involving many cognitive processes, not entities, and so relate to factors that have formative effects on g , which are Stratum-I specific. We posit the existence of two distinguishable sources of general covariance: a formative g (associated primarily with G c ) and a reflective g (associated primarily with G f ), with the latter hierarchically superordinate to the former. Network analysis of “pure” psychometric measures of the G c and G f domains indicates that the former exhibits significantly greater network integrity than the latter, consistent with this formative/reflective model. Random effects meta-analysis of SEM contrast parameters, derived from four large genetically informed studies, finds that subtests assigned to a “ G c ” category are associated with higher-magnitude direct (formative) genetic paths relative to those in a “ G f ” category, suggesting a weak but discriminable and broad Stratum-I g in the residual covariance structure. Given the theorized phylogenetic histories of these two g s, we term the formative (“bottom-up”) g “proto g ” ( g p ), and the reflective (“top-down”) g “neo g ” ( g n ).

Intelligence & Cognitive Abilities
University of Arizona (US), Independent Sector (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 69%
Cognitive Abilities and Testing
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