More Than “Just 1 <i>g</i> ”? The General Intelligence Paradox and Its Solution
Cattell–Horn–Carroll models of intelligence frequently show that, at the group-factor level, G f is most strongly related to g , whereas at the subtest level, G c -associated measures exhibit the highest g loadings. One proposed solution to this “ g paradox” holds that Stratum-III g and Stratum-II G f are identical, and that the sizeable g loadings of crystallized subtests merely reflect the investment of G f into learning. Investment theory is weakly evidenced, however. We argue that the “ g paradox” results from subtests measuring facets of G f exhibiting pronounced specificity for cognitive entities. Capturing everything that goes into G f is difficult on a single-measure basis, hence lower Stratum-I g loadings. The G f group factor is nonetheless reflective of the composite of these entities and therefore is uniquely (at Stratum II) associated with g . Subtests measuring G c broadly index the quality of global systems involving many cognitive processes, not entities, and so relate to factors that have formative effects on g , which are Stratum-I specific. We posit the existence of two distinguishable sources of general covariance: a formative g (associated primarily with G c ) and a reflective g (associated primarily with G f ), with the latter hierarchically superordinate to the former. Network analysis of “pure” psychometric measures of the G c and G f domains indicates that the former exhibits significantly greater network integrity than the latter, consistent with this formative/reflective model. Random effects meta-analysis of SEM contrast parameters, derived from four large genetically informed studies, finds that subtests assigned to a “ G c ” category are associated with higher-magnitude direct (formative) genetic paths relative to those in a “ G f ” category, suggesting a weak but discriminable and broad Stratum-I g in the residual covariance structure. Given the theorized phylogenetic histories of these two g s, we term the formative (“bottom-up”) g “proto g ” ( g p ), and the reflective (“top-down”) g “neo g ” ( g n ).
Authors
- Michael A. Woodley of Menie (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2841-9124)
- Matthew A. Sarraf
- John Fuerst (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1433-2869)
- Mateo Peñaherrera‐Aguirre (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4282-2961)
Institutions
- University of Arizona (US)
- Independent Sector (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Intelligence & Cognitive Abilities
- Published
- 2026-02-04
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.65550/001c.155379
- Primary Topic
- Cognitive Abilities and Testing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00