The promoting effect of reward on the evolution of cooperation in a dynamic network

The independent value of the reward and the structural advantages of dynamic networks have been well-established in their respective fields. Yet, research on their integration remains at an exploratory stage. Thus, we effectively incorporated the reward into the dynamic network model to promote cooperation. Numerical simulation results show a clear pattern: When the temptation to defect is low, the cooperation rate stays high regardless of incentive payoff values. However, when the temptation to defect is high, the cooperation rate only remains high if incentive payoff values exceed a certain threshold. These findings demonstrate that the reward can significantly boost cooperation on dynamic networks. The main contributions of this study are threefold: First, to ensure effective integration of the reward into the model, we carefully designed the payoff calculation rule. Second, using the adjusted payoff values, we ingeniously formulated the network-structure evolution rule. Third, through a detailed analysis of the numerical simulation results, we revealed the underlying mechanism behind the improved cooperation levels.