Contractual Governance Design for Sustainable Performance of Exploitation Alliances: Clause-Level Evidence from Chinese Residential Joint Ventures

Exploitation alliances struggle to maintain long-term stability, adapt to changing conditions, and deliver lasting value. Although contractual governance is widely recognized as crucial to exploitation alliance performance, the role of specific clauses remains unclear, especially in turbulent environments. This study examined how contractual clauses interact and affect exploitation alliance performance. Clause-level data collected from 110 senior managers involved in Chinese residential joint ventures (JVs), which are typical examples of exploitation alliances, were analyzed using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). Results indicate that constitutional clauses, such as decision-making mechanisms and the alliance manager, promote the implementation of input–output controls, which in turn boost operational efficiency, the core of sustainable performance in exploitation alliance. Input–output controls both mediate and moderate the effect of constitutional clauses on risk controls. Conversely, clauses on division of labor and risk control have no direct effect on operational efficiency. This study identifies a three-tier contractual hierarchy and shows that operational efficiency arises mainly from performance-oriented clauses, rather than protective safeguards. These insights offer a micro-foundational view on designing contracts to foster resilient, value-creating collaborations in repeated, resource-intensive ventures.