Crimes as Status Violations: Conceptualising Bipolar Duties in Criminal Law

Abstract In this article, I would like to map out a path towards a relational account of criminal wrongdoing that is as comprehensive as possible. Specifically, I argue that crimes affecting individuals involve the violation of intersubjective, bipolar duties. In this regard, I will directly address the prevailing understanding of crimes as impersonal wrongs, which I consider an obstacle to this project (1): I will demonstrate how it is conceptually feasible to move beyond this ‘impersonal’ paradigm towards a ‘relational’ one (2). This shift is not merely theoretical: bipolar duties and relational wrongs are, in fact, embedded in the way substantive criminal law functions (3). Importantly, this does not imply a loss of the public dimension of crime, but rather its enrichment through an intersubjective dimension of wrongdoing (4). Finally, I will propose potential avenues for future research within the framework of a relational paradigm in criminal law theory (5).