The Objective Value of Childrearing

ABSTRACT Most countries legally recognize the right and duty to raise the child one has carried and given birth to, (i) reflecting a traditional legal presumption (despite widespread abuse and neglect) that parents should be granted wide‐ranging legal rights with respect to their minor children. What interests me here is the moral aspect of the right to childrearing: does childrearing have a value that is objective, and if so, why? In this paper, I explore a theory of intrinsic value that is consistent with an objective stance on childrearing. The theory enables us to make sense of the belief that something can be objectively good as an end‐in‐itself even if a person derives no pleasure from it, thus grounding the distinction between the good of childrearing and the pleasure one might gain from it. This paper is divided into three parts. Section 1 explores the concept of intrinsic goodness. I explain what I mean by ‘childrearing’ as distinguished from procreation, and argue that childrearing is both an objective and intrinsic good. Section 2 clarifies how this works, maintaining that the intimate relationship between parent and child makes the parent's life richer and more worthwhile. (ii) I argue further that childrearing is a component of well‐being rather than an instrumental cause of it. Section 3 sketches three types of theories outlined by Derek Parfit (iii) regarding what is good for a person: hedonistic theories, desire‐fulfilment theories, and objective‐list theories (iv).