Impacts of Policy Instrument Combinations on the Collaborative Innovation of Generic Technology for Green Building: Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

With the global construction industry undergoing a green transformation, stimulating the collaborative innovation (CI) of green building generic technology (GBGT) among stakeholders through the coordinated configuration of multiple policy instruments has become a pressing challenge. Because the existing literature on the CI of GBGT is relatively limited, the primary objective of this study is to investigate the evolutionary process of influencing stakeholders’ CI behavior in the GBGT field by policy instrument combinations. This study establishes an evolutionary game model that includes the government, construction enterprises, and universities and research institutions to analyze their collaborative innovation behaviors in scenarios where the government’s initial strategic probabilities are low, medium, and high. Based on this model, numerical simulations will parameterize supply-side, demand-side, and environmental policy instruments to quantify their systemic effects on the evolution of multiagent strategies. The research findings indicate that: (1) Six potential evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) exist within the system. The ideal ESS identified in this three-party evolutionary game model is characterized by basic motivation, active collaboration, and active collaboration. (2) A higher initial probability of the government’s active motivation accelerates the alignment of enterprises with universities and research institutions toward active strategies. (3) Increased financial subsidies significantly enhance the willingness of government, construction enterprises, and universities and research institutions to adopt active strategies. However, procurement intensity does not significantly influence their strategic activation. Conversely, intensifying reward and punishment measures prolongs the duration required for the system to align toward stable equilibria. The results of this study reveal the mechanism by which policy instrument combinations promote CI in GBGT, thereby providing beneficial references for its sustainable development.